We propose a fully decentralized multi-agent world model that enables both symbol emergence for communication and coordinated behavior through temporal extension of collective predictive coding. Unlike previous research that focuses on either communication or coordination separately, our approach achieves both simultaneously. Our method integrates world models with communication channels, enabling agents to predict environmental dynamics, estimate states from partial observations, and share critical information through bidirectional message exchange with contrastive learning for message alignment. Using a two-agent trajectory drawing task, we demonstrate that our communication-based approach outperforms non-communicative models when agents have divergent perceptual capabilities, achieving the second-best coordination after centralized models. Importantly, our decentralized approach with constraints preventing direct access to other agents' internal states facilitates the emergence of more meaningful symbol systems that accurately reflect environmental states. These findings demonstrate the effectiveness of decentralized communication for supporting coordination while developing shared representations of the environment.

The fusion of Large Language Models (LLMs) and robotic systems has led to a transformative paradigm in the robotic field, offering unparalleled capabilities not only in the communication domain but also in skills like multimodal input handling, high-level reasoning, and plan generation. The grounding of LLMs knowledge into the empirical world has been considered a crucial pathway to exploit the efficiency of LLMs in robotics. Nevertheless, connecting LLMs' representations to the external world with multimodal approaches or with robots' bodies is not enough to let them understand the meaning of the language they are manipulating. Taking inspiration from humans, this work draws attention to three necessary elements for an agent to grasp and experience the world. The roadmap for LLMs grounding is envisaged in an active bodily system as the reference point for experiencing the environment, a temporally structured experience for a coherent, self-related interaction with the external world, and social skills to acquire a common-grounded shared experience.

It is now more than a half-century since the Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis (PSSH) was first articulated as an empirical hypothesis. More recent evidence from work with neural networks and cognitive architectures has weakened it, but it has not yet been replaced in any satisfactory manner. Based on a rethinking of the nature of computational symbols -- as atoms or placeholders -- and thus also of the systems in which they participate, a hybrid approach is introduced that responds to these challenges while also helping to bridge the gap between symbolic and neural approaches, resulting in two new hypotheses, one that is to replace the PSSH and other focused more directly on cognitive architectures.

In the studies on symbol emergence and emergent communication in a population of agents, a computational model was employed in which agents participate in various language games. Among these, the Metropolis-Hastings naming game (MHNG) possesses a notable mathematical property: symbol emergence through MHNG is proven to be a decentralized Bayesian inference of representations shared by the agents. However, the previously proposed MHNG is limited to a two-agent scenario. This paper extends MHNG to an N-agent scenario. The main contributions of this paper are twofold: (1) we propose the recursive Metropolis-Hastings naming game (RMHNG) as an N-agent version of MHNG and demonstrate that RMHNG is an approximate Bayesian inference method for the posterior distribution over a latent variable shared by agents, similar to MHNG; and (2) we empirically evaluate the performance of RMHNG on synthetic and real image data, enabling multiple agents to develop and share a symbol system. Furthermore, we introduce two types of approximations -- one-sample and limited-length -- to reduce computational complexity while maintaining the ability to explain communication in a population of agents. The experimental findings showcased the efficacy of RMHNG as a decentralized Bayesian inference for approximating the posterior distribution concerning latent variables, which are jointly shared among agents, akin to MHNG. Moreover, the utilization of RMHNG elucidated the agents' capacity to exchange symbols. Furthermore, the study discovered that even the computationally simplified version of RMHNG could enable symbols to emerge among the agents.

We attempt to define what is necessary to construct an Artificial Scientist, explore and evaluate several approaches to artificial general intelligence (AGI) which may facilitate this, conclude that a unified or hybrid approach is necessary and explore two theories that satisfy this requirement to some degree.

The following defines intent, an arbitrary task and its solutions, and then argues that an agent which always constructs what is called an Intensional Solution would qualify as artificial general intelligence. We then explain how natural language may emerge and be acquired by such an agent, conferring the ability to model the intent of other individuals labouring under similar compulsions, because an abstract symbol system and the solution to a task are one and the same.

In order to construct an ethical artificial intelligence (AI) two complex problems must be overcome. Firstly, humans do not consistently agree on what is or is not ethical. Second, contemporary AI and machine learning methods tend to be blunt instruments which either search for solutions within the bounds of predefined rules, or mimic behaviour. An ethical AI must be capable of inferring unspoken rules, interpreting nuance and context, possess and be able to infer intent, and explain not just its actions but its intent. Using enactivism, semiotics, perceptual symbol systems and symbol emergence, we specify an agent that learns not just arbitrary relations between signs but their meaning in terms of the perceptual states of its sensorimotor system. Subsequently it can learn what is meant by a sentence and infer the intent of others in terms of its own experiences. It has malleable intent because the meaning of symbols changes as it learns, and its intent is represented symbolically as a goal. As such it may learn a concept of what is most likely to be considered ethical by the majority within a population of humans, which may then be used as a goal. The meaning of abstract symbols is expressed using perceptual symbols of raw sensorimotor stimuli as the weakest (consistent with Ockham's Razor) necessary and sufficient concept, an intensional definition learned from an ostensive definition, from which the extensional definition or category of all ethical decisions may be obtained. Because these abstract symbols are the same for both situation and response, the same symbol is used when either performing or observing an action. This is akin to mirror neurons in the human brain. Mirror symbols may allow the agent to empathise, because its own experiences are associated with the symbol, which is also associated with the observation of another agent experiencing something that symbol represents.

We argue that an explainable artificial intelligence must possess a rationale for its decisions, be able to infer the purpose of observed behaviour, and be able to explain its decisions in the context of what its audience understands and intends. To address these issues we present four novel contributions. Firstly, we define an arbitrary task in terms of perceptual states, and discuss two extremes of a domain of possible solutions. Secondly, we define the intensional solution. Optimal by some definitions of intelligence, it describes the purpose of a task. An agent possessed of it has a rationale for its decisions in terms of that purpose, expressed in a perceptual symbol system grounded in hardware. Thirdly, to communicate that rationale requires natural language, a means of encoding and decoding perceptual states. We propose a theory of meaning in which, to acquire language, an agent should model the world a language describes rather than the language itself. If the utterances of humans are of predictive value to the agent's goals, then the agent will imbue those utterances with meaning in terms of its own goals and perceptual states. In the context of Peircean semiotics, a community of agents must share rough approximations of signs, referents and interpretants in order to communicate. Meaning exists only in the context of intent, so to communicate with humans an agent must have comparable experiences and goals. An agent that learns intensional solutions, compelled by objective functions somewhat analogous to human motivators such as hunger and pain, may be capable of explaining its rationale not just in terms of its own intent, but in terms of what its audience understands and intends. It forms some approximation of the perceptual states of humans.

Humans use signs, e.g., sentences in a spoken language, for communication and thought. Hence, symbol systems like language are crucial for our communication with other agents and adaptation to our real-world environment. The symbol systems we use in our human society adaptively and dynamically change over time. In the context of artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive systems, the symbol grounding problem has been regarded as one of the central problems related to {\it symbols}. However, the symbol grounding problem was originally posed to connect symbolic AI and sensorimotor information and did not consider many interdisciplinary phenomena in human communication and dynamic symbol systems in our society, which semiotics considered. In this paper, we focus on the symbol emergence problem, addressing not only cognitive dynamics but also the dynamics of symbol systems in society, rather than the symbol grounding problem. We first introduce the notion of a symbol in semiotics from the humanities, to leave the very narrow idea of symbols in symbolic AI. Furthermore, over the years, it became more and more clear that symbol emergence has to be regarded as a multifaceted problem. Therefore, secondly, we review the history of the symbol emergence problem in different fields, including both biological and artificial systems, showing their mutual relations. We summarize the discussion and provide an integrative viewpoint and comprehensive overview of symbol emergence in cognitive systems. Additionally, we describe the challenges facing the creation of cognitive systems that can be part of symbol emergence systems.

That intelligence is a form of information processing and that the framework of modern digital computers provides pretty much all that is needed for representing and processing information for doing AI are two of the most foundational of such assumptions. Turing (1950) explicitly articulated this idea in the late 1940s, and later Newell and Simon (1976) proposed the physical symbol system hypothesis (PSSH) as a newer form of the same set of intuitions about the relation between computation and thinking. In this tradition, the computational approach is not just one way of making intelligent systems, but representing and processing information within the computational framework is necessary for intelligence as a process, wherever it is implemented. The language of thought (LOT) hypothesis, of which Fodor (1975) has given the most well-known exposition, is a variant of the computational hypothesis in AI. LOT holds that underlying thinking is a medium that has the properties of formal symbolic languages that we are familiar with in computer science.